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Ethical principles in machine learning and artificial
intelligence: cases from the field and possible ways
forward
Samuele Lo Piano 1,2✉
Decision-making on numerous aspects of our daily lives is being outsourced to machine-
learning (ML) algorithms and artificial intelligence (AI), motivated by speed and efficiency in
the decision process. ML approaches—one of the typologies of algorithms underpinning
artificial intelligence—are typically developed as black boxes. The implication is that ML code
scripts are rarely scrutinised; interpretability is usually sacrificed in favour of usability and
effectiveness. Room for improvement in practices associated with programme development
have also been flagged along other dimensions, including inter alia fairness, accuracy,
accountability, and transparency. In this contribution, the production of guidelines and
dedicated documents around these themes is discussed. The following applications of AI-
driven decision-making are outlined: (a) risk assessment in the criminal justice system, and
(b) autonomous vehicles, highlighting points of friction across ethical principles. Possible
ways forward towards the implementation of governance on AI are finally examined.
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0501-9 OPEN
1 School of the Built Environment, University of Reading, Reading, UK. 2Open Evidence, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain.
✉email: s.lopiano@reading.ac.uk










Artificial intelligence (AI) is the branch of computer sciencethat deals with the simulation of intelligent behaviour incomputers as regards their capacity to mimic, and ideally
improve, human behaviour. To achieve this, the simulation of
human cognition and functions, including learning and problem-
solving, is required (Russell, 2010). This simulation may limit
itself to some simple predictable features, thus limiting human
complexity (Cowls, 2019).
AI became a self-standing discipline in the year 1955
(McCarthy et al., 2006) with significant development over the last
decades. AI resorts to ML to implement a predictive functioning
based on data acquired from a given context. The strength of ML
resides in its capacity to learn from data without need to be
explicitly programmed (Samuel, 1959); ML algorithms are
autonomous and self-sufficient when performing their learning
function. This is the reason why they are ubiquitous in AI
developments. Further to this, ML implementations in data sci-
ence and other applied fields are conceptualised in the context of
a final decision-making application, hence their prominence.
Applications in our daily lives encompass fields, such as
(precision) agriculture (Sennaar, 2019), air combat and military
training (Gallagher, 2016; Wong, 2020), education (Sears, 2018),
finance (Bahrammirzaee, 2010), health care (Beam and Kohane,
2018), human resources and recruiting (Hmoud and Laszlo,
2019), music composition (Cheng, 2009/09), customer service
(Kongthon et al., 2009), reliable engineering and maintenance
(Dragicevic et al., 2019), autonomous vehicles and traffic man-
agement (Ye, 2018), social-media news-feed (Rader et al., 2018),
work scheduling and optimisation (O’Neil, 2016), and several
others.
In all these fields, an increasing amount of functions are being
ceded to algorithms to the detriment of human control, raising
concern for loss of fairness and equitability (Sareen et al., 2020).
Furthermore, issues of garbage-in-garbage-out (Saltelli and Fun-
towicz, 2014) may be prone to emerge in contexts when external
control is entirely removed. This issue may be further exacerbated
by the offer of new services of auto-ML (Chin, 2019), where the
entire algorithm development workflow is automatised and the
residual human control practically removed.
In the following sections, we will (i) detail a series of research
questions around the ethical principles in AI; (ii) take stock of the
production of guidelines elaborated in the field; (iii) showcase
their prominence in practical examples; and (iv) discuss actions
towards the inclusion of these dimensions in the future of AI
ethics.
Research questions on the ethical dimensions of artificial
intelligence
Critical aspects in AI deployment have already gained traction in
mainstreaming literature and media. For instance, according to
O’Neil (2016), a main shortcoming of ML approaches is the fact
these resort to proxies for driving trends, such as person’s ZIP
code or language in relation with the capacity of an individual to
pay back a loan or handle a job, respectively. However, these
correlations may be discriminatory, if not illegal.
Potential black swans (Taleb, 2007) in the code should also be
considered. These have been documented, for instance, in the
case of the Amazon website, for which errors, such as the quo-
tation of plain items (often books) up to 10,000 dollars (Smith,
2018) have been reported. While mistakes about monetary values
may be easy to spot, the situation may become more complex and
less intelligible when incommensurable dimensions come to play.
That is the reason why a number of guidelines on the topic of
ethics in AI have been proliferating over the last few years.
While reflections around the ethical implications of machines
and automation deployment were already put forth in the ’50s
and ’60s (Samuel, 1959; Wiener, 1988), the increasing use of AI in
many fields raises new important questions about its suitability
(Yu et al., 2018). This stems from the complexity of the aspects
undertaken and the plurality of views, stakes, and values at play.
A fundamental aspect is how and to what extent the values and
the perspectives of the involved stakeholders have been taken care
of in the design of the decision-making algorithm (Saltelli, 2020).
In addition to this ex-ante evaluation, an ex-post evaluation
would need to be put in place so as to monitor the consequences
of AI-driven decisions in making winners and losers.
To wrap up, it is fundamental to assess how and if ethical
aspects have been included in the AI-driven decision-making
implemented by asking questions such as:
● What are the most prominent ethical concerns raised by
large-scale deployment of AI applications?
● How are these multiple dimensions interwoven?
● What are the actions the involved stakeholders are carrying
out to address these concerns?
● What are possible ways forward to improve ML and AI
development and use over their full life-cycle?
We will firstly examine the production of relevant guidelines in
the fields along with academic secondary literature. These aspects
will then be discussed in the context of two applied cases:
(i) recidivism-risk assessment in the criminal justice system, and
(ii) autonomous vehicles.
Guidelines and secondary literature on AI ethics,
its dimensions and stakes
The production of dedicated documents has been skyrocketing
from 2016 (Jobin et al., 2019). We here report on the most
prominent international initiatives. A suggested reading on
national and international AI strategies providing a comprehen-
sive list of documents (Future of Earth Institute, 2020).
The France’s Digital Republic Act gives the right to an expla-
nation as regards decisions on an individual made through the
use of administrative algorithms (Edwards and Veale, 2018). This
law touches upon several aspects including:
● how and to what extent the algorithmic processing con-
tributed to the decision-making;
● which data was processed and its source;
● how parameters were treated and weighted;
● which operations were carried out in the treatment.
Sensitive governmental areas, such as national security and
defence, and the private sector (the largest user and producer of
ML algorithms by far) are excluded from this document.
An international European initiative is the multi-stakeholder
European Union High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelli-
gence, which is composed by 52 experts from academia, civil
society, and industry. The group produced a deliverable on the
required criteria for AI trustworthiness (Daly, 2019). Even articles
21 and 22 of the recent European Union General Data Protection
Regulation include passages functional to AI governance,
although further action has been recently demanded from the
European Parliament (De Sutter, 2019). In this context, China has
also been allocating efforts on privacy and data protection
(Roberts, 2019).
As regards secondary literature, Floridi and Cowls (2019)
examined a list of statements/declarations elaborated since 2016
from multi-stakeholder organisations. A set of 47 principles has
been identified, which mapped onto five overarching dimensions
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(Floridi and Cowls, 2019): beneficence, non-maleficence, auton-
omy, justice and, explicability. The latter is a new dimension
specifically acknowledged in the case of AI, while the others were
already identified in the controversial domain of bioethics.
Jobin et al. (2019) reviewed 84 documents, which were pro-
duced by several actors of the field, almost half of which from
private companies or governmental agencies. The classification
proposed by Jobin et al. (2019) is around a slightly different set of
values: transparency, justice and fairness, non-maleficience,
responsibility and privacy. Other potentially relevant dimensions,
such as accountability and responsibility, were rarely defined in
the studies reviewed by these authors.
Seven of the most prominent value statements from the AI/ML
fields were examined in Greene et al. (2019): The Partnership on
AI to Benefit People and Society; The Montreal Declaration for a
Responsible Development of Artificial Intelligence; The Toronto
Declaration Protecting the rights to equality and non-
discrimination in machine-learning systems; OpenAI; The Centre
for Humane Technology; Fairness, Accountability and Transpar-
ency in Machine Learning; Axon’s AI Ethics Board for Public
Safety. Greene et al. (2019) found seven common core elements
across these documents: (i) design’s moral background (universal
concerns, objectively measured); (ii) expert oversight; (iii) values-
driven determinism; (iv) design as locus of ethical scrutiny;
(v) better building; (vi) stakeholder-driven legitimacy; and,
(vii) machine translation.
Mittelstadt (2019) critically analysed the current debate and
actions in the field of AI ethics and noted that the dimensions
addressed in AI ethics are converging towards those of medical
ethics. However, this process appears problematic due to four
main differences between medicine and the medical professionals
on one side, and AI and its developers on the other. Firstly, the
medical professional rests on common aims and fiduciary duties,
which AI developers lack. Secondly, a formal profession with a set
of clearly defined and governed good-behaviour practices exists in
medicine. This is not the case for AI, which also lacks a full
understanding of the consequences of the actions enacted by
algorithms (Wallach and Allen, 2008). Thirdly, AI faces the dif-
ficulty of translating overarching principle into practices. Even its
current setting of seeking maximum speed, efficiency and profit
clashes with the resource and time requirements of an ethical
assessment and/or counselling. Finally, the accountability of
professionals or institutions is at this stage mainly theoretical,
having the vast majority of these guidelines been defined on a
merely voluntary basis and hence with the total lack of a sanc-
tionary scheme for non-compliance.
Points of friction between ethical dimensions. Higher trans-
parency is a common refrain when discussing ethics of algo-
rithms, in relation to dimensions such as how an algorithmic
decision is arrived at, based on what assumptions, and how this
could be corrected to incorporate feedback from the involved
parties. Rudin (2019) argued that the community of algorithm
developers should go beyond explaining black-box models by
developing interpretable models in the first place.
On a larger scale, the use of open-source software in the
context of ML applications has already been advocated for over a
decade (Thimbleby, 2003) with an indirect call for tools to
execute more interpretable and reproducible programming such
as Jupyter Notebooks, available from 2015 onwards. However,
publishing scripts expose their developers to the public scrutiny
of professional programmers, who may find shortcomings in the
development of the code (Sonnenburg, 2007).
Ananny and Crawford (2018) comment that resorting to full
algorithmic transparency may not be an adequate means to
address their ethical dimensions; opening up the black-box would
not suffice to disclose their modus operandi. Moreover, developers
of algorithm may not be capable of explaining in plain language
how a given tool works and what functional elements it is based
on. A more social relevant understanding would encompass the
human/non-human interface (i.e., looking across the system
rather than merely inside). Algorithmic complexity and all its
implications unravel at this level, in terms of relationships rather
than as mere self-standing properties.
Other authors pointed to possible points of friction between
transparency and other relevant ethical dimensions. de Laat (2018)
argues that transparency and accountability may even be at odds in
the case of algorithms. Hence, he argues against full transparency
along four main lines of reasoning: (i) leaking of privacy sensitive
data into the open; (ii) backfiring into an implicit invitation to game
the system; (iii) harming of the company property rights with
negative consequences on their competitiveness (and on the
developers reputation as discussed above); (iv) inherent opacity of
algorithms, whose interpretability may be even hard for experts (see
the example below about the code adopted in some models of
autonomous vehicles). All these arguments suggest limitations to
full disclosure of algorithms, be it that the normative implications
behind these objections should be carefully scrutinised.
Raji et al. (2020) suggest that a process of algorithmic auditing
within the software-development company could help in tackling
some of the ethical issues raised. Larger interpretability could be
in principle achieved by using simpler algorithms, although this
may come at the expenses of accuracy. To this end, Watson and
Floridi (2019) defined a formal framework for interpretable ML,
where explanatory accuracy can be assessed against algorithmic
simplicity and relevance.
Loss in accuracy may be produced by the exclusion of
politically critical features (such as gender, race, age, etc.) from
the pool of training predictive variables. For instance, Amazon
scrapped a gender-biased recruitment algorithm once it realised
that despite excluding gender, the algorithm was resorting to
surrogate gender variables to implement its decisions (Dastin,
2018). This aspect points again to possible political issues of a
trade-off between fairness, demanded by society, and algorithmic
accuracy, demanded by, e.g., a private actor.
Fairness may be further hampered by reinforcement effects.
This is the case of algorithms attributing credit scores, that have a
reinforcement effect proportional to people wealth that de facto
rules out credit access for people in a more socially difficult
condition (O’Neil, 2016).
According to Floridi and Cowls (2019) a prominent role is also
played by the autonomy dimension; the possibility of refraining
from ceding decision power to AI for overriding reasons (e.g., the
gain of efficacy is not deemed fit to justify the loss of control over
decision-making). In other words, machines autonomy could be
reduced in favour of human autonomy according to this meta-
autonomy dimension.
Contrasting dimensions in terms of the theoretical framing of
the issue also emerged from the review of Jobin et al. (2019), as
regards interpretation of ethical principles, reasons for their
importance, ownership and responsibility of their implementa-
tion. This also applies to different ethical principles, resulting in
the trade-offs previously discussed, difficulties in setting prior-
itisation strategies, operationalisation and actual compliance with
the guidelines. For instance, while private actors demand and try
to cultivate trust from their users, this runs counter to the need
for society to scrutinise the operation of algorithms in order to
maintain developer accountability (Cowls, 2019). Attributing
responsibilities in complicated projects where many parties and
developers may be involved, an issue known as the problem of
many hands (Nissenbaum, 1996), may indeed be very difficult.
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Conflicts may also emerge between the requirements to
overcome potential algorithm deficits in accuracy associated with
large data bases and the individual rights to privacy and
autonomy of decision. Such conflicts may exacerbate tensions,
further complicating agreeing on standards and practices.
In the following two sections, the issues and points of friction
raised are examined in two practical case studies, criminal justice
and autonomous vehicles. These examples have been selected due
to their prominence in the public debate on the ethical aspects of
AI and ML algorithms.
Machine-learning algorithms in the field of criminal justice
ML algorithms have been largely used to assist juridical delib-
eration in many states of the USA (Angwin and Larson, 2016).
This country faces the issue of the world’s highest incarcerated
population, both in absolute and per-capita terms (Brief, 2020).
The COMPAS algorithm, developed by the private company
Northpointe, attributes a 2-year recidivism-risk score to arrested
people. It also evaluates the risk of violent recidivism as a score.
The fairness of the algorithm has been questioned in an
investigative report, that examined a pool of cases where a reci-
divism score was attributed to >18,000 criminal defendants in
Broward County, Florida and flagged up a potential racial bias in
the application of the algorithm (Angwin and Larson, 2016).
According to the authors of the report, the recidivism-risk was
systematically overestimated for black people: the decile dis-
tribution of white defendants was skewed towards the lower end.
Conversely, the decile distribution of black defendants was only
slightly decreasing towards the higher end. The risk of violent
recidivism within 2 years followed a similar trend. This analysis
was debunked by the company, which, however, refused to dis-
close the full details of its proprietary code. While the total
number of variables amounts to about 140, only the core variables
were disclosed (Northpointe, 2012). The race of the subject was
not one of those.
Here, a crucial point is how this fairness is to be attained:
whether it is more important a fair treatment across groups of
individuals or within the same group. For instance, let us take the
case of gender, where men are overrepresented in prison in
comparison with women. As to account for this aspect, the
algorithm may discount violent priors for men in order to reduce
their recidivism-risk score. However, attaining this sort of algo-
rithmic fairness would imply inequality of treatment across
genders (Berk et al., 2018).
Fairness could be further hampered by the combined use of
this algorithm with others driving decisions on neighbourhood
police patrolling. The fact these algorithms may be prone to drive
further patrolling in poor neighbourhoods may result from a
training bias as crimes occurring in public tend to be more fre-
quently reported (Karppi, 2018). One can easily understand how
these algorithms may jointly produce a vicious cycle—more
patrolling would lead to more arrests that would worsen the
neighbourhood average recidivism-risk score, which would in turn
trigger more patrolling. All this would result in exacerbated
inequalities, likewise the case of credit scores previously discussed
(O’Neil, 2016).
A potential point of friction may also emerge between the
algorithm dimensions of fairness and accuracy. The latter may be
theoretically defined as the classification error in terms of rate of
false positive (individuals labelled at risk of recidivism, that did
not re-offend within 2 years) and false negative (individuals
labelled at low risk of recidivism, that did re-offend within the
same timeframe) (Loi and Christen, 2019). Different classification
accuracy (the fraction of observed outcomes in disagreement with
the predictions) and forecasting accuracy (the fraction of
predictions in disagreement with the observed outcomes) may
exist across different classes of individuals (e.g., black or white
defendants). Seeking equal rates of false positive and false nega-
tive across these two pools would imply a different forecasting
error (and accuracy) given the different characteristics of the two
different training pools available for the algorithm. Conversely,
having the same forecasting accuracy would come at the expense
of different classification errors between these two pools (Corbett-
Davies et al., 2016). Hence, a trade-off exists between these two
different shades of fairness, which derives from the very statistical
properties of the data population distributions the algorithm has
been trained on. However, the decision-making rests again on the
assumptions the algorithm developers have adopted, e.g., on
the relative importance of false positive and false negative (i.e., the
weights attributed to the different typologies of errors, and the
accuracy sought (Berk, 2019)). When it comes to this point, an
algorithm developer may decide (or be instructed) to train his/her
algorithm to attribute, e.g., a five/ten/twenty times higher weight
for a false negative (re-offender, low recidivism-risk score) in
comparison with a false positive (non re-offender, high
recidivism-risk score).
As with all ML, an issue of transparency exists as no one knows
what type of inference is drawn on the variables out of which the
recidivism-risk score is estimated. Reverse-engineering exercises
have been run so as to understand what are the key drivers on the
observed scores. Rudin (2019) found that the algorithm seemed to
behave differently from the intentions of their creators (North-
pointe, 2012) with a non-linear dependence on age and a weak
correlation with one’s criminal history. These exercises (Rudin,
2019; Angelino et al., 2018) showed that it is possible to imple-
ment interpretable classification algorithms that lead to a similar
accuracy as COMPAS. Dressel and Farid (2018) achieved this
result by using a linear predictor-logistic regressor that made use
of only two variables (age and total number of previous convic-
tions of the subject).
Machine-learning algorithms in the field of autonomous
vehicles
The case of autonomous vehicles, also known as self-driving
vehicles, poses different challenges as a continuity of decisions is
to be enacted while the vehicle is moving. It is not a one-off
decision as in the case of the assessment of recidivism risk.
An exercise to appreciate the value-ladenness of these decisions
is the moral-machine experiment (Massachussets Institute of
Technology 2019)—a serious game where users are requested to
fulfil the function of an autonomous-vehicle decision-making
algorithm in a situation of danger. This experiment entails per-
forming choices that would prioritise the safety of some cate-
gories of users over others. For instance, choosing over the death
of car occupants, pedestrians, or occupants of other vehicles, et
cetera. While such extreme situations may be a simplification of
reality, one cannot exclude that the algorithms driving an
autonomous-vehicle may find themselves in circumstances where
their decisions may result in harming some of the involved parties
(Bonnefon et al., 2019).
In practice, the issue would be framed by the algorithm in
terms of a statistical trolley dilemma in the words of Bonnefon
et al. (2019), whereby the risk of harm for some road users will be
increased. This corresponds to a risk management situation by all
means, with a number of nuances and inherent complexity
(Goodall, 2016).
Hence, autonomous vehicles are not bound to play the role of
silver bullets, solving once and forever the vexing issue of traffic
fatalities (Smith, 2018). Furthermore, the way decisions enacted
could backfire in complex contexts to which the algorithms had
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no extrapolative power, is an unpredictable issue one has to deal
with (Wallach and Allen, 2008; Yurtsever et al., 2020).
Coding algorithms that assure fairness in autonomous vehicles
can be a very challenging issue. Contrasting and incommensur-
able dimensions are likely to emerge (Goodall, 2014) when
designing an algorithm to reduce the harm of a given crash. For
instance, in terms of material damage against human harm. Odds
may emerge between the interest of the vehicle owner and pas-
sengers, on one side, and the collective interest of minimising the
overall harm, on the other. Minimising the overall physical harm
may be achieved by implementing an algorithm that, in the cir-
cumstance of an unavoidable collision, would target the vehicles
with the highest safety standards. However, one may want to
question the fairness of targeting those who have invested more in
their own and others’ safety. The algorithm may also face a
dilemma between low probability of a serious harm and higher
probability of a mild harm. Unavoidable normative rules will
need to be included in the decision-making algorithms to tackle
these types of situations.
Accuracy in the context of self-autonomous vehicles rests on
their capacity to correctly simulate the course of the events. While
this is based on physics and can be informed by the numerous
sensors these vehicles are equipped with, unforeseen events can
still play a prominent role, and profoundly affect the vehicles
behaviour and reactions (Yurtsever et al., 2020). For instance,
fatalities due to autonomous-vehicle malfunctioning were repor-
ted as caused by the following failures: (i) the incapability of
perceiving a pedestrian as such (National Transport Safety Board
2018); (ii) the acceleration of the vehicle in a situation when
braking was required due to contrasting instructions from dif-
ferent algorithms the vehicle was hinged upon (Smith, 2018). In
this latter case, the complexity of autonomous-vehicle algorithms
was witnessed by the millions lines of code composing their
scripts, a universe no one fully understands in the words of The
Guardian (Smith, 2018), so that the causality of the decisions
made was practically impossible to scrutinise. Hence, no correc-
tive action in the algorithm code may be possible at this stage,
with no room for improvement in accuracy.
One should also not forget that these algorithms are learning
by direct experience and they may still end up conflicting with the
initial set of ethical rules around which they have been conceived.
Learning may occur through algorithms interaction taking place
at a higher hierarchical level than the one imagined in the first
place (Smith, 2018). This aspect would represent a further open
issue to be taken into account in their development (Markham
et al., 2018). It also poses further tension between the accuracy a
vehicle manufacturer seeks and the capability to keep up the
agreed fairness standards upstream from the algorithm develop-
ment process.
Discussion and conclusions
In this contribution, we have examined the ethical dimensions
affected by the application of algorithm-driven decision-making.
These are entailed both ex-ante, in terms of the assumptions
underpinning the algorithm development, and ex-post as regards
the consequences upon society and social actors on whom the
elaborated decisions are to be enforced.
Decision-making-based algorithms rest inevitably on assump-
tions, even silent ones, such as the quality of data the algorithm is
trained on (Saltelli and Funtowicz, 2014), or the actual modelling
relations adopted (Hoerl, 2019), with all the implied con-
sequences (Saltelli, 2019).
A decision-making algorithm will always be based on a formal
system, which is a representation of a real system (Rosen, 2005).
As such, it will always be based on a restricted set of relevant
relations, causes, and effects. It does not matter how complicated
the algorithm may be (how many relations may be factored in), it
will always represent one-specific vision of the system being
modelled (Laplace, 1902).
Eventually, the set of decision rules underpinning the AI
algorithm derives from human-made assumptions, such as, where
to define the boundary between action and no action, between
different possible choices. This can only take place at the human/
non-human interface: the response of the algorithm is driven by
these human-made assumptions and selection rules. Even the
data on which an algorithm is trained on are not an objective
truth, they are dependent upon the context in which they have
been produced (Neff et al., 2017).
Tools for technically scrutinising the potential behaviour of an
algorithm and its uncertainty already exist and could be included
in the workflow of algorithm development. For instance, global
sensitivity analysis (Saltelli, 2008) may help in exploring how the
uncertainty in the input parameters and modelling assumptions
would affect the output. Additionally, a modelling of the mod-
elling process would assist in the model transparency and in
addressing questions such as: Are the results from a particular
model more sensitive to changes in the model and the methods
used to estimate its parameters, or to changes in the data?
(Majone, 1989).
Tools of post-normal-science inspiration for knowledge and
modelling quality assessment could be adapted to the analysis of
algorithms, such as the NUSAP (Numeral Unit Spread Assess-
ment Pedigree) notation system for the management and com-
munication of uncertainty (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990; Van Der
Sluijs, 2005) and sensitivity auditing (Saltelli and Funtowicz,
2014), respectively. Ultimately, developers should acknowledge
the limits of AI, and what its ultimate function should be in the
equivalent of an Hippocratic Oath for ML developers (O’Neil,
2016). An example comes from the field of financial modelling,
with a manifesto elaborated in the aftermath of the 2008 financial
crisis (Derman and Wilmott, 2009).
As to address these dimensions, value statements and guide-
lines have been elaborated by political and multi-stakeholder
organisations. For instance, The Alan Turing Institute released a
guide for responsible design and implementation of AI (Leslie,
2019) that covers the whole life-cycle of design, use, and mon-
itoring. However, the field of AI ethics is just at its infancy and it
is still to be conceptualised how AI developments that encompass
ethical dimensions could be attained. Some authors are pessi-
mistic, such as Supiot (2017) who speaks of governance by
numbers, where quantification is replacing the traditional
decision-making system and profoundly affecting the pillar of
equality of judgement. Trying to revert the current state of affairs
may expose the first movers in the AI field to a competitive
disadvantage (Morley et al., 2019). One should also not forget that
points of friction across ethical dimensions may emerge, e.g.,
between transparency and accountability, or accuracy and fair-
ness as highlighted in the case studies. Hence, the development
process of the algorithm cannot be perfect in this setting, one has
to be open to negotiation and unavoidably work with imperfec-
tions and clumsiness (Ravetz, 1987).
The development of decision-making algorithms remains quite
obscure in spite of the concerns raised and the intentions man-
ifested to address them. Attempts to expose to public scrutiny the
algorithms developed are yet scant. As are the attempt to make
the process more inclusive, with a higher participation from all
the stakeholders. Identifying a relevant pool of social actors may
require an important effort in terms of stakeholders’ mapping so
as to assure a complete, but also effective, governance in terms of
number of participants and simplicity of working procedures. The
post-normal-science concept of extended peer communities could
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assist also in this endeavour (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1997).
Example-based explanations (Molnar, 2020) may also contribute
to an effective engagement of all the parties by helping in bridging
technical divides across developers, experts in other fields, and
lay-people.
An overarching meta-framework for the governance of AI in
experimental technologies (i.e., robot use) has also been proposed
(Rego de Almeida et al., 2020). This initiative stems from the
attempt to include all the forms of governance put forth and
would rest on an integrated set of feedback and interactions
across dimensions and actors. An interesting proposal comes
from Berk (2019), who asked for the intervention of super partes
authorities to define standards of transparency, accuracy and
fairness for algorithm developers in line with the role of the Food
and Drug administration in the US and other regulation bodies. A
shared regulation could help in tackling the potential competitive
disadvantage a first mover may suffer. The development pace of
new algorithms would be necessarily reduced so as to comply
with the standards defined and the required clearance processes.
In this setting, seeking algorithm transparency would not be
harmful for their developers as scrutiny would be delegated to
entrusted intermediate parties, to take place behind closed doors
(de Laat, 2018).
As noted by a perceptive reviewer, ML systems that keep
learning are dangerous and hard to understand because they can
quickly change. Thus, could a ML system with real world con-
sequences be “locked down” to increase transparency? If yes, the
algorithm could become defective. If not, transparency today may
not be helpful in understanding what the system does tomorrow.
This issue could be tackled by hard-coding the set of rules on the
behaviour of the algorithm, once these are agreed upon among
the involved stakeholders. This would prevent the algorithm-
learning process from conflicting with the standards agreed.
Making mandatory to deposit these algorithms in a database
owned and operated by this entrusted super-partes body could
ease the development of this overall process.
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